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1. Introduction
With rapid advances of information technologies, a large amount of digital contents,
especially multimedia, can be processed by electronic devices such as computers and
smartphones. Protecting the copyrights of digital contents is of paramount importance, and
digital fingerprinting has attracted a lot of attention for this purpose. In digital fingerprinting,
a user’s ID called a fingerprint is embedded into an original content with a watermarking
technique, and then the fingerprinted contents are distributed to users.
Digital fingerprinting requires robustness against collusion attacks, in which more than one
illicit user colludes to forge illegal contents. In the context of multimedia fingerprinting,
well-known collusion attacks are the interleaving attack (Boneh & Shaw, 1998; Fernandez &
Soriano, 2004; Silverberg et al., 2003; Staddon et al., 2001) and the averaging attack (Trappe et
al., 2003; Wu et al., 2004). The averaging attack is particularly effective when fingerprint’s
watermark is embedded into host multimedia via the spread spectrum technique. Trappe et al.
have devised collusion-secure codes, called anti-collusion (AC) codes, against the averaging
attack based on block designs (Trappe et al., 2003). TheAC codes given by Trappe et al. are also
called AND-AC codes. Subsequently, several studies have proposed a method for increasing
coding rates of AC codes based on a various class of block designs and related methods.
Some examples are based on group-divisible design (Kang et al., 2006), finite geometries and
low-density matrices (Yagi et al., 2009), and cover-free families of sets (Li et al., 2009). In order
to further increase the coding rate, concatenated coding in which an outer error correcting
code is concatenated with an inner AC code, has been proposed (Yagi et al., 2007). This
method seems attractive since any AND-AC codes can be used as the inner codes. Whereas
the concatenated codes given by (Yagi et al., 2007) greatly improve the coding rates of AC
codes, the codes need exponential-time complexity in the code length for decoding (detecting
the colluders).
In this chapter, we consider amethod for constructing AC codeswith polynomial-time encoding
and decoding algorithms based on concatenated coding. We give a sufficient condition
on outer error correcting codes assuring that the concatenated AC codes have a designed
resilience. A polynomial-time decoding algorithm is proposed based on the list-decoding of
error correcting codes. A key idea is that after the inner decoding, from the set of candidate
outer symbols, we randomly create a sequence, which is input to the list-decoding of the
6
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outer code. If the outer code’s parameters satisfy the derived condition, the list-decoding
algorithm can output at least one colluder’s codeword correctly. We repeat this procedure
until all the colluders’ codewords are found. The proposed coding method guarantees the
perfect detection of all the colluders in the absence of noise. Although, for fixed code length
and resilience, the number of codewords of the proposed concatenated codes is smaller than
that of codes in (Yagi et al., 2007), it asymptotically approaches the exponential order in the
overall code length, resulting in a greater number of codewords than those of the AC codes
in (Trappe et al., 2003) and (Yagi et al., 2009). In the proposed concatenated coding, any AC
codes can be used as the inner code. Using AC-codes given by (Kang et al., 2006) and (Li et
al., 2009) as the inner codes, we obtain analogous results.
In related work, some coding and decoding methods have been proposed for the interleaving
attack (also known as the attack based on the marking assumption), in which one of colluders
i-th codeword symbol is selected as the i-th codeword symbol of the forged fingerprint (e.g.,
(Boneh & Shaw, 1998; Staddon et al., 2001)). In (Silverberg et al., 2003) and (Fernandez &
Soriano, 2004), the list decoding of fingerprinting codes is used. This work assures that at
least one of the colluders is identified with polynomial time complexity in the code length. It
seems that, in our problem setting, i.e., against the averaging attack, the realization of efficient
coding is much easier because the forged fingerprint can have more information under the
averaging attack. This is true in the sense that we can identify all the colluders with AC
codes. However, the code construction is rather hard in terms of coding rate, since the use
of orthogonal sequences in AC codes (Trappe et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2004) prevents the code
size from growing exponentially in the code length. In this chapter, we aim at realizing the
polynomial-time complexity in the code length as well as increasing the code size greatly
based on concatenated coding and list decoding of outer codes.
The proposed method is attractive in the sense that we can construct it in a deterministic
way for given parameters and implement encoding and decoding with polynomial-time
complexity in the code length. However, its code size still grows semi-exponential in the code
length. This means that the coding rate of this code, which is defined as the logarithm of the
code size per codeword symbol, goes to zero as the code length tends to infinity. Recently, it
has been pointed out by (Koga, 2010) that there exist AC codes with a strictly positive coding
rate although the way of constructing such codes is still unknown. In the last part of this
chapter, we show that there exist polynomial-time AC codes with a strictly positive coding
rate, based on the argument given by (Koga, 2010).
2. Fingerprinting model
2.1 Digital fingerprinting
When distributing a digital content to users, a codeword (fingerprint) corresponding to each
user is embedded into the original content by a watermarking technique. Some illicit users
may collude and attempt to forge their fingerprints (collusion attack) so that their fingerprints
are not revealed from an illegally utilized content. The detector of colluders estimates
colluders’ fingerprints from the forged fingerprint.
Let Γ = {1, 2, . . . , |Γ|} be the set of users of a digital content, where | · | expresses the cardinality
of its argument set. We denote a codeword of user j ∈ Γ by bj = (b
(1)
j , b
(2)
j , . . . , b
(N)
j ) ∈
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Fig. 1. A encoding procedure for multimedia fingerprinting using the spread spectrum
technique. ⊕ denotes the real number addition of w
(l)
j with the host content x.
{0, 1}n×N where b
(l)
j = (b
(l)
j1 , b
(l)
j2 , . . . , b
(l)
jn )
T ∈ {0, 1}n for l = 1, . . . , N (T denotes the
transposition). Let
{ui ∈ R
M| ||ui||
2 = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n} (1)
be a set of n orthogonal sequences of unit power. The fingerprint watermark wj =
(w
(1)
j ,w
(2)
j , . . . ,w
(N)
j ) is created via the spread spectrum technique in which w
(l)
j is generated
by {ui ∈ R
M| i = 1, 2, . . . , n} and b
(l)
j as
w
(l)
j =
n
∑
i=1
(2b
(l)
ji − 1)ui. (2)
Note that there always exists a set of n orthogonal sequences for every M ≥ n. Then the
created watermark signal is embedded into a host signal. Denoting the host signal by x =
(x(1), . . . , x(N)) ∈ RM×N, the distributed content to user j ∈ Γ is1 yj = x + wj ∈ R
M×N. A
encoding procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Since fingerprints are embedded with a watermark technique, any user cannot detect their
own fingerprint wj from the watermarked content yj. Therefore illicit users may collude to
disturb their fingerprints by creating a forged content from their distributed contents.
2.2 Assumed collusion attack
We consider a set of colluders of size h ≥ 1, denoted by Sc ⊆ Γ, andwithout loss of generality,
we assume Sc = {1, 2, . . . , h}. The attacked host signal by a set of colluders Sc is expressed as
1 More precisely, each wj is multiplied by some value called Just-Difference Noticeable (JDN) coefficient
(Podilchuk & Zeng, 1998), before it is added to the host signal.
127olynomial-Time Codes Ag inst Av r ging Attack for Multimedia Fingerprinting
www.intechopen.com
4 Will-be-set-by-IN-TECH
Fig. 2. Illustration of the averaging attack at segment l conducted by Sc = {1, 2, . . . , h}. The
sequence bˆ
(l)
j is an estimate which corresponds to b
(l)
j .
y = (y(1), y(2), . . . , y(N)) such that
y(l) =
1
h
h
∑
j=1
y
(l)
j (3)
for l = 1, 2, . . . , N. From (2) and the relation y
(l)
j = x
(l) + wj, (3) can also be expressed as
y(l) = x(l) +
1
h
h
∑
j=1
n
∑
i=1
(2b
(l)
ij − 1)ui, (4)
for l = 1, . . . , N. The detector of the colluders estimates the set of colluders Sc from the
attacked host signal y ∈ RM. This attack is called the averaging attack, which is an effective
collusion attack in multimedia fingerprinting (Trappe et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2004). Figure 2
illustrates the averaging attack at segment l conducted by Sc = {1, 2, . . . , h}.
In practical situations, additive noise z ∈ RM×1 is added to y(l) in (4). However, we assume
the absence of noise for the time being to focus on designing codes as in (Trappe et al., 2003).
Later, some extension will be discussed to deal with noise.
2.3 Concatenated anti-collusion code
In this chapter, we consider concatenated coding, which increases the coding rates of AC
codes in (Trappe et al., 2003), (Yagi et al., 2009), etc. In concatenated coding, we use two kinds
of codes, namely an outer code and an inner code (Forney, 1966).
Let Co ⊆ GFN(q) be a q-ary linear (N,K,D) error correcting code of length N, the number of
information symbols, K, and minimum distance D (Lin & Costello, 2004), which is used as the
outer code. We denote any codeword by cj = (c
(1)
j , c
(2)
j , . . . , c
(N)
j ) ∈ C
o .
The encoder first generates a codeword of the outer code Co, and then each symbol c
(l)
j ∈
GF(q) for l = 1, 2, . . . , N is mapped into a codeword b
(l)
j ∈ B, where B ⊆ {0, 1}
n×1 is a binary
AC code (Trappe et al., 2003) of length n (Fig. 3). The mapping of a symbol c
(l)
j ∈ GF(q) to a
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Fig. 3. Encoding procedure for a concatenated AC code. A codeword of the outer code is first
generated, and each symbol is mapped into a codeword of the inner code. The total length of
the concatenated AC code is N0 = Nn, where N and n are the code length of the outer code
and the inner code, respectively.
codeword b
(l)
j ∈ B is unique and pre-determined. The code B is used as the inner code C
i. We
assume that |B| ≥ q for one-to-one correspondence between q symbols of the outer code and
a subset of codewords of B. The mapped codeword is bj = (b
(1)
j , . . . , b
(N)
j ) ∈ {0, 1}
n×N . We
denote the binary concatenated code of length N0 := Nn by C ⊆ {0, 1}
n×N . After generating
bj ∈ C, we compute a watermark of each inner codeword b
(l)
j ∈ B, denoted by w
(l)
j , by (2).
If we use a trivial error correcting code, namely the (1,1,1) error correcting code, then this
concatenated code reduces to the AC code in (Trappe et al., 2003) or (Yagi et al., 2009).
3. Inner codes and outer codes
3.1 Inner codes: AC codes based on finite geometries
Trappe et al. (Trappe et al., 2003) have devised anti-collusion (AC) codes, which are used as
inner codes in our concatenated coding scheme. For the purpose of simple explanation, we
assume N = 1 in this subsection. First, we give the definition of the AC codes.
Definition 1. Assume the non-blind scenario, in which the host signal x is known to the
detector. If a set of colluders Sc satisfies h ≤ ℓ for some positive integer ℓ ≥ 2, the code
which can find all the colluders in Sc is referred to as an ℓ-resilient AC code. The parameter ℓ is
called the resilience of the AC codes. ✷
Lemma 1 (Yagi et al., 2009). Assume that a binary matrix satisfies (i) the Hamming weight of each
column is at least k, and (ii) any pair of distinct two columns has at most t 1-components in common.
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Then, the AC code whose codewords are all column vectors of this matrix is a (⌈k/t⌉ − 1)-resilient AC
code. i.e., if h ≤ ⌈k/t⌉ − 1, any set of colluders Sc can be uniquely detected
2. ✷
Remark 1. Let Q(Sc) be the set of symbol positions where all of the fingerprints in Sc take
the 0-component. Then an ℓ-resilient AC code in (Trappe et al., 2003) and (Yagi et al., 2009)
uniquely identifies the setQ(Sc) for any Sc with h ≤ ℓ. ✷
From Remark 1, since an ℓ-resilient AC code uniquely identifies Q(Sc) for any Sc of size less
than or equal to ℓ, the code reveals the set of colluders Sc. For a detailed procedure of the
inner decoding, refer to (Trappe et al., 2003).
In (Yagi et al., 2009), an algebraic construction of ℓ-resilient AC codes has been proposed
based on finite geometries. We will use these AC codes as the inner code in concatenated
coding for a comparison purpose though any AC codes can also be used. For a prime p and
two positive integers m and s (m ≥ 2, s ≥ 1), the m-dimensional Euclidean geometry EG(m, ps)
over a Galois field GF(ps) consists of points, lines, and hyperplanes. Any points in EG(m, ps) are
pms m-dimensional vectors over GF(ps), and they form an m-dimensional vector space V over
GF(ps). For µ such that 0 ≤ µ ≤ m, a µ-dimensional hyperplane (generally, called a µ-flat)
is a µ-dimensional subspace of V and its cosets, and any µ-flat contains pµs points. Points
correspond to 0-flats. Any pair of two µ-flats, (F1, F2), has at most one (µ− 1)-flat in common,
which implies F1 and F2 have at most p
(µ−1)s points in common. In a Euclidean geometry
EG(m, ps), there are
fEG(µ) = p
(m−µ)s
µ
∏
i=1
p(m−i+1)s − 1
p(µ−i+1)s − 1
(5)
µ-flats in total.
Letting n0 = fEG(0), consider an n0 × fEG(µ) matrix Bµ = (bij). An element bij in a matrix
Bµ takes bij = 1 if point i is contained in µ-flat j, or takes bij = 0 otherwise. This matrix Bµ is
called the incident matrix of µ-flats over points in EG(m, ps). Allocating the j-th column vector bj
of Bµ to the j-th user’s fingerprint, the obtained code Bµ = {bj} is called the µ-th order EG-AC
code.
Lemma 2 (Yagi et al., 2009). For given EG(m, ps), the µ-th order EG-AC code Bµ is a (ps −
1)-resilient AC code of length n0 = p
ms and the number of codewords fEG(µ). ✷
We mention parameters of EG-AC codes (Yagi et al., 2009). Let µ∗ express dimension µ that
maximizes fEG(µ). The number of codewords is fEG(µ
∗) = νn
1
4 (m+2)
0 with some 1 ≤ ν < 2
m
2 .
This means that the number of codewords increases in polynomial order Θ(n
1
4 (m+2)
0 ) of code
length n0.
3.2 Outer codes: Existing condition on error correcting codes
We state a previous condition on outer error-correcting codes (Yagi et al., 2007).
2 ⌈v⌉ expresses the minimum integer not less than v.
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We define the Hamming distance between a sequence and a sequence set. Let cj =
(c
(1)
j , c
(2)
j , . . . , c
(N)
j ) ∈ C
o such that c
(l)
j ∈ GF(q) for l = 1, 2, . . . , N be a codeword of the outer
code Co. We define the following sets:
Y (l) = {c
(l)
j | j ∈ Sc}, (6)
and
Y = Y (1) ×Y (2) × · · · × Y (N) =
N
∏
l=1
Y (l). (7)
The set Y (l) expresses the set of symbols over GF(q) which give y(l) (recall that there is
one-to-one correspondence between symbols over GF(q) and a subset of inner codewords).
We define the Hamming distance between a symbol v ∈ GF(q) and the set Y (l) as
δ(v,Y (l)) =
{
0, if v ∈ Y (l);
1, otherwise.
(8)
We define the Hamming distance between a codeword cj = (c
(1)
j , c
(2)
j , . . . , c
(N)
j ) ∈ C
o such
that c
(l)
j ∈ GF(q), l = 1, 2, . . . , N, and the set Y as
dH(cj,Y) =
N
∑
l=1
δ(c
(l)
j ,Y
(l)). (9)
Definition 2. For a set of colluders Sc such that h ≤ ℓ and any codeword cj ∈ C
o with
j ∈ Γ \ Sc, if at least r codewords ci such that i ∈ Sc satisfy
dH(ci,Y) < dH(cj,Y), (10)
then the concatenated code C is called the (ℓ, r)-resilient concatenated AC (CAC) code for Y . ✷
The following theorem states a condition on the outer code Co assuring that a concatenated
code C becomes an (ℓ, h)-resilient AC code.
Theorem 1 (Yagi et al., 2007). Assume that we use an ℓ-resilient AC code B as the inner code. If
h ≤ ℓ and a q-ary (N,K,D) error-correcting code such that
D > N
(
1−
1
ℓ
)
(11)
is used as the outer code, the concatenated code C is an (ℓ, h)-resilient CAC code for Y . ✷
The (ℓ, r)-resilient CAC codes enable us to detect at least r colluders in Sc by simply
calculating the Hamming distance after obtaining each Y (l) for l = 1, 2, . . . , N via the inner
decoding. However, we need to exhaustively search codewords in Co , and a decoding
algorithm requires exponential time complexity in outer code length N, i.e.,O(qN). In (Yagi et
al., 2007), the use of the Reed-Solomon (RS) codes is suggested as the outer codes. The RS code
is an instance of the maximum distance separable (MDS) codes which meet Singleton’s bound
131olynomial-Time Codes Ag inst Av r ging Attack for Multimedia Fingerprinting
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D ≤ N − K + 1 with equality, and N = q − 1 for a prime power q (Lin & Costello, 2004). In
this case, the decoding complexity is expressed as O(2N log N). Further, N0 = Θ(N
m+6
m+2 ) since
n = Θ(N
4
m+2 ). Therefore, the overall decoding complexity3 is O(2N0 log N0 ).
4. Polynomial-time concatenated AC codes
4.1 Condition on outer codes with ℓ-resilience
A main idea to give polynomial-time decodable concatenated codes is that after the inner
decoding, we randomly create a sequence from the candidate symbol set Y . Upon input of
this sequence, a list-decoding algorithm for the outer code outputs at least one colluder’s
codeword. Like this, we consider iterating the following procedure:
(i) Set τ := 1 and Y
(l)
0 := Y
(l) for each l = 1, . . . , N.
(ii) Randomly pick a symbol y˜
(l)
τ from Y
(l)
τ−1 for each l = 1, . . . , N, and set Y˜
(l)
τ := {y˜
(l)
τ } and
y˜τ := (y˜
(1)
τ , . . . , y˜
(N)
τ ).
(iii) Find all j ∈ Γ such that
dH(cj, y˜τ) ≤ N(1− 1/ℓ), (12)
and the set of found colluders is denoted by Sc,τ. We define Y
(l)
τ and Yτ in a similar way
to (6) and (7), respectively, by replacing Sc with Sc \
⋃τ
i=1 Sc,i (notice that |Y
(l)
τ | ≤ |Y
(l)
τ−1|
for every l = 1, . . . , N).
(iv) Set τ := τ + 1, and go to step (ii). We repeat this procedure until there are no codewords
satisfying (12).
Proposition 1. Assume that the inner code is an ℓ-resilient AC code B. If h ≤ ℓ and a q-ary (N,K,D)
error-correcting code such that
D > N
(
1−
1
ℓ2
)
(13)
is used as the outer code, the concatenated code C is an (ℓ, hτ)-resilient CAC code for each Y˜τ , where
hτ = |Sc,τ|.
(Proof ) Let cj = (c
(1)
j , c
(2)
j , . . . , c
(N)
j ) ∈ C
o such that c
(l)
j ∈ GF(q) for l = 1, 2, . . . , N be the
j-th users’ outer codeword. By the definition of Sc,τ, there are hτ colluders whose ci, i ∈ Sc,τ,
satisfy dH(ci, y˜τ) ≤ N(1− 1/ℓ). On the other hand, since any fingerprint cj, j ∈ Γ \ Sc, agrees
at most (N − D) symbols with each fingerprint ci, i ∈ Sc,τ, any cj agrees at most ℓ(N − D)
symbols with y˜τ. Therefore we have
dH(cj, y˜τ) = N − ℓ(N − D)
> N − ℓN + ℓN
(
1−
1
ℓ2
)
= N
(
1−
1
ℓ
)
. (14)
3 The complexity of encoding is O(N20 ) in the concatenated coding.
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Since dH(ci, y˜τ) ≤ N(1 − 1/ℓ), (14) implies dH(cj, y˜τ) > dH(ci, y˜τ). Therefore we can
correctly detect hτ colluders in Sc,τ by comparing the Hamming distance from y˜τ . ✷
The condition (13) is the same as the condition of ℓ-traceability (TA) codes against the
interleaving attack (Staddon et al., 2001; Silverberg et al., 2003), which identify at least one
colluder in Sc of size less than or equal to ℓ. The condition (13) is weaker than (11) in the sense
that (13) is sufficient to satisfy (11).
By Singleton’s bound, the minimum distance of a linear error correcting code satisfies D ≤
N − K + 1. Since it is desirable to make D as large as possible, we may well use the RS code
satisfying D = N − K + 1 as the outer code. For given prime power q, there always exists a
lengthened/shortened RS code for every N ≤ q if K ≥ 1 and D = N−K + 1. Other promising
candidates for the outer code are algebraic geometry (AG) codes or near-MDS expander
codes in (Guruswami, 2004), which asymptotically meet Singleton’s bound. All these codes
can be decoded by the Guruswami-Sudan (GS) list-decoding algorithm (Guruswami, 2004),
which corrects up to N(1−
√
(K − 1)/N) errors with the polynomial time complexity in N
(Silverberg et al., 2003).
4.2 Decoding algorithm for concatenated AC codes
We propose a polynomial-time decoding algorithm for a concatenated code C base on
Proposition 1. As in (Fernandez & Soriano, 2004) and (Silverberg et al., 2003) for ℓ-TA
codes against the interleaving attack, we employ a code Co that can be decoded by the GS
list-decoding algorithm. The detail decoding procedure is described as follows:
[Proposed Decoding Algorithm]
(1) For each y(l), l = 1, . . . , N given by (4), find all the members in Y (l) via the decoding of the
inner AC code.
(2) Set τmax := max1≤l≤N |Y
(l)|, τ := 1 and Y
(l)
0 := Y
(l) for each l = 1, . . . , N.
(3) Randomly pick y˜
(l)
τ ∈ Y
(l)
τ−1 for each l = 1, . . . , N, and set y˜τ := (y˜
(1)
τ , . . . , y˜
(N)
τ ).
(4) Execute the GS list-decoding algorithm for y˜τ , and find the set Sc,τ.
(5) Set Y
(l)
τ for l = 1, . . . , N as
Y
(l)
τ :=
{
Y (l) \
⋃τ−1
i=1 Y
(l)
i , if Y
(l) 
=
⋃τ−1
i=1 Y
(l)
i ,
Y (l), otherwise,
(15)
and set Yτ := ∏
N
l=1 Y
(l)
τ .
(6) If τ = τmax or |
⋃τ
i=1 Sc,i| = τmax, then output
⋃τ
i=1 Sc,i as colluders and halt the algorithm.
Otherwise, set τ := τ+ 1 and go to step (3).
We note that in step (1), which corresponds to the inner decoding, Y (l) for l = 1, . . . , N are
correctly found although we cannot see Sc itself. We show that if the outer code satisfies the
condition (13), then Sc,τ is correctly found at step (4) in each iteration by the following lemmas:
Lemma 3. If h ≤ ℓ and an outer code satisfying (13) is concatenated with an ℓ-resilient AC code, there
is some l ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that |Y (l)| = h. i.e., the maximum number of iterations of the proposed
decoding algorithm is τmax = h.
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(Proof ) If h = 2, then there is at least D positions such that |Y (l)| = 2 because the Hamming
distance of any two outer codewords is at least D. For the case h ≥ 3, the symbols of user 1’s
codeword c1 and user 2’s codeword c2 are different in at least D positions and we denote this
position set by D. Then user 3’s codeword c3 cannot agree more than N − D symbols with
each of c1 and c2 in the position indexed by D. i.e.,
|{i|cji = c3i, i ∈ D}| ≤ N − D, for j = 1, 2. (16)
Therefore, there are at least D − 2(N − D) positions in which all three codewords disagree.
When we consider the forth codeword c4, the same argument gives at least D − (2+ 3)(N −
D) positions in which all four codewords disagree. By induction, among {c1, c2, . . . , cν} such
that ν ≤ h, the number of positions in which all the codewords c1, . . . , cν disagree is at least
D− (2+ 3+ · · ·+ (ν− 1))(N − D)
> D−
1
2
(ℓ− 2)(ℓ+ 1)(N − D). (17)
Since (13) is satisfied, the r.h.s. of (17) is further bounded by
N
2
(
1+
1
ℓ
)
(18)
from below. Equation (18) implies that the lemma holds. ✷
Lemma 4. If h ≤ ℓ and the outer code satisfies (13), all the codewords satisfying (12) for given y˜τ are
correctly found at step (4).
(Proof ) If (13) is satisfied, then we can easily check
N(1− 1/ℓ) < N
(
1−
√
(K − 1)/N
)
(19)
where the r.h.s. expresses the correcting radius of the GS list-decoding algorithm (Silverberg
et al., 2003). Therefore all the codewords satisfying (12) are found in step (4). ✷
The next theorem states the number of colluders captured by the proposed decoding
algorithm in the absence of noise.
Theorem 2. If h ≤ ℓ and we use an ℓ-resilient AC code B as the inner code and an (N,K,D) error
correcting code satisfying (13) as the outer code, then the proposed decoding algorithm finds all the
colluders in Sc.
(Proof ) In the first iteration τ = 1, obviously there is at least one colluder’s codeword cj ∈ C
o
which is in the distance dH(ci, y˜1) ≤ N(1− 1/ℓ) and can be decoded by the GS list-decoding.
This implies that all the colluders can be found if h = 2.
Let some h, 3 ≤ h ≤ ℓ, be given, and we first assume that in each iteration only one colluder’s
codeword is found before iteration τ, 2 ≤ τ ≤ h. In iteration τ, we assume that the colluders
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found so far are denoted by c˜1, . . . , c˜τ−1 for simplicity. Let a function ∆(τ) be defined as
∆(τ) = D − (τ − 1)(N − D) (20)
Since any two codewords agree in at most N−D positions, each of remaining c˜τ, . . . , c˜h agrees
at least ∆(τ) positions with Yτ−1, which has been calculated at step (5) in iteration τ − 1. By
using (13), ∆(τ) is bounded as
∆(τ) > N(1− τ/ℓ2). (21)
When randomly picking y˜τ at step (3) in iteration τ, there is at least one codeword among
c˜τ , . . . , c˜h which agrees greater than or equal to ∆(τ)/(h − τ + 1) positions with y˜τ, which is
bounded as
∆(τ)/(h − τ+ 1) > N(1− τ/ℓ2)/(h − τ+ 1). (22)
The r.h.s. of (22) is greater than N/ℓ since
N
h − τ+ 1
(
1−
τ
ℓ2
)
−
N
ℓ
=
N
{
ℓ(ℓ− h) + ℓτ− ℓ− τ
}
(h − τ + 1)ℓ2
≥
N(hτ − h − τ)
(h − τ+ 1)ℓ2
, (23)
where we substitute h = ℓ to obtain the last inequality. The r.h.s. of (23) is apparently greater
than zero for h ≥ 3 and τ ≥ 2. This in turn implies that there is at least one codeword
cj, τ ≤ j ≤ h, such that dH(cj, y˜τ) ≤ N(1− 1/ℓ) and it can be found by the GS-list decoding
algorithm.
The case where in some iteration τ′ < τ, more than one colluder’s codeword is found can be
proved in a similar way. ✷
We state the time complexity of the proposed decoding algorithm by assuming an RS code
is used as the outer code. As for the inner decoding (step (1)), we conduct the exhaustive
search of all the combinations of ℓ or less inner codewords. The number of inner codewords
is q = O(N), so the time complexity for each inner decoding is O(Nℓ), which is polynomial
time in code length N0. In each iteration, we execute the GS list-decoding algorithm for the
outer code, which requires the time complexity of O(N15) for iteration τ = 1 when h = ℓ
and of O(N4) for iteration τ ≥ 2 (or τ ≥ 1 when h < ℓ). Since the maximum number of
iteration is ℓ, the overall decoding complexity is bounded by max{O(Nℓ+1),O(N15)} when
h = ℓ. When h < ℓ, we can also show that the overall decoding complexity is bounded by
max{O(Nℓ+1),O(hN4)}.
4.3 Coding rates of concatenated AC codes
As for the inner code C i = B, we require only the condition that |B| ≥ q, where q is the
number of symbols of an outer code Co. If |B|/q > 1, we can divide the CAC codes into
several groups. Define g = ⌊|B|/q⌋. We first divide an inner code B into g disjoint subsets
B(1),B(2), . . . ,B(g) such that |B(i)| ≥ q, i = 1, 2, . . . , g. By using each B(i) as the inner codes,
we obtain g disjoint concatenated codes, denoted by C(1), C(2), . . . , C(g). The overall code C =
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⋃g
i=1 C
(i) is an ℓ-resilient CAC code with size F0 := gq
K if each concatenated code C(i) is an
ℓ-resilient AC code. Coding rate R0 of C is given by R0 = (log2 gq
K)/N0.
Example 1. We show the numbers of codewords of five CAC codes C which consist of EG-AC
inner codes C i = B and MDS outer codes Co (shortened RS codes (Lin & Costello, 2004)). For
comparison, we show conventional EG-AC codes Bµ (Yagi et al., 2007) with the same resilience
and the code length. Table 1 shows the parameters of original and concatenated EG-AC codes
and Table 2 shows the logarithm of the number of codewords for each code. From Table 2, it
can be found that the CAC codes is effective. In particular, as the code length becomes large,
the effectiveness of the CAC codes is enhanced. ✷
We now analyze the asymptotic number of codewords by assuming an (N,K,D) RS code
satisfying (13) and an EG-AC code of the maximal order µ∗ are used as the outer code and the
inner code, respectively. For simplicity, we assume q = N, which means that the lengthened
RS code is used. The EG-AC code of the maximal order µ∗ satisfies fEG(µ
∗) = νn
1
4 (m+2) with
some ν, 1 ≤ ν < 2
m
2 (Yagi et al., 2009). There exists an m > 3 such that νn
1
4 (m+1) < q ≤
νn
1
4 (m+2), and hence
νn
1
4 (m+1) < N ≤ νn
1
4 (m+2) (24)
from N = q. Note that the condition (13) is equivalent to K < N/ℓ2 + 1 since K = N − D + 1,
but there always exit RS codes with K ≥ N/ℓ2 (this can be confirmed by setting D = ⌈N(1−
1/ℓ2)⌉). Then the total number of codewords F0 := q
K = NK satisfies
F0 ≥ 2
N log N/ℓ2 . (25)
Since the overall length of the concatenated code is N0 = Nn where n ≤ (N/ν)
4
m+1 from (24),
we have N ≥ (N0ν
4
m+1 )
m+1
m+5 , and (25) becomes
F0 ≥ 2
ν′ · m+1
(m+5)
·
log N0
ℓ2
·N
m+1
(m+5)
0 (26)
where ν′ = ν
4
m+5 . Furthermore, by carefully investing the parameters of EG-AC codes, we
find
m2 + 6m + 2m log
ℓ+1 2 = 4 logℓ+1 N0, (27)
resulting in m = Θ(2(log
ℓ+1 N0)
1
2 ). We have m → ∞ as N0 → ∞ and ν
′ ≥ 1. Thus, for any
ǫ, 0 < ǫ < 1, there exists a concatenated AC code such that
F0 ≥ 2
(1−ǫ)N1−ǫ0 log N0
ℓ2 (28)
with sufficiently large N0. Equation (28) implies that the number of codewords increases
arbitrarily closely in the exponential order of N0 log N0/ℓ
2, which is equal to a single RS code
of length N0. Thus, the number of codewords of the proposed concatenated codes is much
greater than those of the AC codes in (Yagi et al., 2009).
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No. EG-AC code Bµ
Concatenated EG-AC code C
Inner Code C i Outer Code Co
(m, ps) n (m, ps) n (N,K, D) q
(i) (4, 31) 81 (2, 31) 9 (9, 3, 7) 11
(ii) (6, 31) 729 (3, 31) 27 (27, 7, 21) 32
(iii) (7, 31) 2187 (4, 31) 81 (27, 7, 21) 81
(iv) (8, 31) 6561 (4, 31) 81 (81, 21, 61) 81
(v) (6, 22) 4096 (3, 22) 64 (64, 8, 57) 64
Table 1. Parameters of original and concatenated EG-AC codes
No.
Resilience Code length # of Information Symbols
ℓ Nn log2 |Bµ | log2 |C|
(i) 2 81 10.19 10.38
(ii) 2 729 19.80 35.00
(iii) 2 2187 26.16 44.38
(iv) 2 6561 32.52 133.14
(v) 3 4096 24.52 48.00
Table 2. Examples of the number of codewords of original and concatenated EG-AC codes
4.4 Conditions of outer codes with ℓ-resilience and e-error correcting capability
The ℓ-resilient AC codes in Sect. 3.1 do not have error-correcting capability. On the other
hand, with concatenated coding, we can make ℓ-resilient CAC codes have such capability. In
the presence of noise in (4), i.e.,
y(l) = 1/h
h
∑
j=1
y
(l)
j + z (29)
where z ∈ Rn×1 is a vector of additive noise, this is particularly important because some of
inner decoders may result in mis-correction (Trappe et al., 2003). For some non-negative
integer e, we derive conditions on an outer code Co assuring that a concatenated code C have
an (ℓ, r)-resilience and e-error correcting capability4.
Proposition 2. Assume that an ℓ-resilient AC code B is used as the inner code, and an (N,K,D)
error correcting code satisfying
D > N
(
1−
1
ℓ2
)
+
(ℓ+ 1)e
ℓ2
(30)
is used as the outer code. If h ≤ ℓ and the number of inner decoders whose outputs are in error is less
than or equal to e, the concatenated code C is an (ℓ, hτ)-resilient CAC code for each Y˜τ (defined in Sect.
4.1), where hτ = |Sc,τ|.
(Proof ) Let cj = (c
(1)
j , c
(2)
j , . . . , c
(N)
j ) ∈ C
o such that c
(l)
j ∈ GF(q) for l = 1, 2, . . . , N be the
j-th users’ outer codeword. There are hτ colluders such that each of ci, i ∈ Sc,τ agrees at least
4 We can introduce erasure symbols instead of error symbols as in (Fernandez & Soriano, 2004), which
was introduced against the interleaving attack.
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(N − e)/ℓ symbols in Y˜τ , i.e., we have
dH(ci, Y˜τ) ≤ N − (N − e)/ℓ. (31)
On the other hand, any fingerprint cj, j ∈ Γ \ Sc agrees at most ℓ(N − D) + e symbols in Y˜τ .
We have
dH(cj, Y˜τ)− dH(ci, Y˜τ) ≥ N − ℓ(N − D)− e
−(N − (N − e)/ℓ) > 0, (32)
for ℓ ≥ 2. Therefore the condition (10) is satisfied. ✷
Theorem 3. Assume that we use an ℓ-resilient AC code B as the inner code and an (N,K,D) error
correcting code satisfying (30) as the outer code. If the number of inner decoders whose outputs are in
error is less than or equal to e, then the proposed decoding algorithm finds all the colluders in Sc. ✷
It follows from (13) and (30) that the e-error correcting capability requires a more stringent
condition on D by (ℓ+ 1)e/ℓ2. In this case, we can also use an MDS or a near-MDS code as
the outer code Co.
5. Existence of polynomial-time AC codes with a positive rate
The proposed method given in the previous section is of importance from the fact that we
can construct it in a deterministic way for given parameters and implement encoding and
decoding with polynomial-time complexity in n. Theorem 2 indicates that the size of the
concatenated AC codes still grows semi-exponential in the code length, and the coding rate of
this code goes to zero as n tends to infinity. Recently, it has been pointed out by (Koga, 2010)
that there exist AC codes with a strictly positive coding rate although it is not clear how to
construct such codes. Here, we show that there exist polynomial-time AC codes with a strictly
positive coding rate, based on the argument given by (Koga, 2010).
First, we review a result on the coding rate of ℓ-resilient AC codes shown by (Koga, 2010).
Theorem 4 (Koga, 2010). For given ℓ ≥ 2, there exists at least one ℓ-resilient AC code with the
coding rate
R =
1
4ℓ + 1
. (33)
for sufficiently large n. ✷
Theorem 4 is an “ existence theorem”which indicates only the existence of good AC codes but
does not imply how to construct such codes. In addition, encoding and decoding complexity
is in the exponential order of n, which seems impractical even though such codes can be
obtained. The next theorem shows the existence of ℓ-resilient AC codes that can be encoded
and decoded with polynomial order complexity in n.
Theorem 5. For given ℓ ≥ 2, there exists at least one ℓ-resilient concatenated AC code that can
encoded and decoded with polynomial order complexity in n with the coding rate
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R =
1
ℓ2(4ℓ + 1)
. (34)
for sufficiently large n.
(Proof ) This theorem can be easily proven by noticing that the coding rate is decreased by the
factor of 1/ℓ2 if concatenated coding is used. ✷
From Theorem 5, we can reduce the encoding and decoding complexity to a great extent by
allowing the coding rate decreases by the factor of 1
ℓ2
. However, it is guaranteed that the
existence of an ℓ-resilient concatenated AC code whose coding rate is still strictly positive for
all ℓ ≥ 2.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, for multimedia fingerprinting, concatenated coding in which the outer code
is a near-MDS error correcting code and the inner code is a class of AC codes in (Trappe et
al., 2003) and (Yagi et al., 2009), was proposed. Using AC codes given by (Kang et al., 2006)
and (Li et al., 2009) as the inner codes, a similar result can be obtained. Based on list-decoding
for the outer code, we proposed a polynomial-time decoding algorithm. Furthermore, we
derived a condition assuring that concatenated AC codes have e-error correcting capability.
In the last part of this chapter, we have shown the existence of AC codes that can be encoded
and decoded with polynomial time complexity and have a positive rate. It is of interest to
investigate how to construct such codes in a deterministic way.
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